The Lesotho Court of Appeal’s recent decision in Independent Electoral Commission and Others v Rasephei represents a significant contribution to the jurisprudence on judicial interpretation, procedural finality, and the scope of review by the Labour Court. The case arose out of disciplinary proceedings brought against Mr Rasephei, the Manager of Public Relations at the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), whose employment was terminated following a hearing in which he had been denied legal representation. This denial formed the crux of the initial dispute before the Labour Court, which ruled on 1 August 2023 that the respondent was entitled to legal representation “in the ongoing disciplinary hearing.” The interpretation of this phrase, particularly the word “ongoing,” gave rise to further litigation when the IEC resumed the disciplinary process without recommencing it de novo, prompting the respondent to return to court seeking broader declaratory relief.
The Labour Court in its second judgment went beyond a mere clarification of its earlier order. It declared the disciplinary process null and void, set aside the IEC’s dismissal decision, and ordered that a new disciplinary hearing be held from the beginning, this time with legal representation throughout. These orders, especially the first two, had not been expressly sought in the pleadings and appeared to grant substantive relief under the guise of interpretation. The Court of Appeal, in partially overturning the judgment, held that the Labour Court had exceeded its powers, violating the principle of functus officio and granting relief ultra petita.
The doctrine of functus officio holds that a court, having rendered its final decision, cannot revisit that judgment except under limited statutory exceptions or where clerical errors are concerned. This principle was articulated with clarity in Firestone South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Gentiruco AG and has been adopted in Lesotho jurisprudence, including in The Prime Minister v Manyokole. The Labour Court, in attempting to correct an ambiguity in its earlier order, instead altered its substance by invalidating the disciplinary hearing and the dismissal, measures that required a fresh application for review or appeal, not mere interpretation. By doing so, the court infringed upon the finality of its own proceedings and expanded its remedial jurisdiction in a procedurally impermissible manner.
It is worth noting that the original dispute before the Labour Court concerned the right to legal representation in internal disciplinary proceedings. In this regard, the court’s first judgment was consistent with the principles laid out in Moeko v Maluti Mountain Brewery, where denial of representation was found to compromise procedural fairness. However, the second application, ostensibly brought under section 24(2)(k) of the Labour Code (Amendment) Act 2000, could not have served as a valid vehicle to revisit the fairness of the dismissal itself. That section permits the court to resolve ambiguity in its judgments but does not authorise the substitution of new and materially different remedies.
The Court of Appeal’s intervention reaffirmed two doctrinal limits: first, that a court cannot grant relief beyond what is prayed for; and second, that interpretation cannot be used as a backdoor mechanism to reopen or reargue a matter that has already been decided. Importantly, the appellate court still upheld the respondent’s right to legal representation going forward, thereby preserving the protective thrust of the original ruling, while simultaneously restoring the procedural order necessary for the administration of justice.
This case underscores a broader tension in labour adjudication between achieving substantive fairness and maintaining procedural integrity. The Labour Court’s efforts to remedy what it perceived as injustice were arguably well-intentioned, but its method, recasting interpretation as substantive review, undermined the legitimacy of judicial process. Labour courts in Lesotho, though empowered to advance equitable outcomes, must remain cautious not to exceed the jurisdictional boundaries that distinguish interpretation from review.
Moreover, the decision offers timely guidance on how ambiguity in court orders should be addressed: narrowly and promptly, without straying into areas better suited to review or appeal mechanisms. The broader issue of whether the dismissal was fair could have properly been the subject of a substantive application under the Labour Code, rather than embedded within an interpretive motion.
Finally, while the case reinforces the right of employees to legal representation in disciplinary proceedings, particularly where it may affect the outcome, it also signals that even this right must be enforced within the bounds of procedural law. The sanctity of due process demands that both rights and remedies be pursued through appropriate legal channels.
In its judgment, the Court of Appeal has offered a measured reassertion of judicial restraint. By striking a balance between the enforcement of individual rights and the preservation of legal process, the court has clarified the limits of interpretive authority within Lesotho’s labour law framework. The decision in IEC v Rasephei thus stands not only as a precedent on the interpretation of ambiguous orders but as a broader reaffirmation of the rule of law in administrative adjudication.