In May 2025, the Prime Minister of Lesotho declared a national state of emergency in response to the escalating crisis of youth unemployment. This unprecedented move marked the first instance of an economic and social condition, rather than a natural disaster or conflict, triggering a constitutional emergency under s 23 of the Constitution of Lesotho 1993. The declaration has raised significant legal, constitutional, and policy concerns. This article examines the constitutional framework for declaring a state of emergency in Lesotho, analyses the legal validity of using this mechanism for socioeconomic conditions, and reflects on the implications for democratic governance, separation of powers, and the justiciability of socio-economic rights.
Section 23(1) of the Constitution provides that a state of emergency may be declared ‘in time of war, invasion, general insurrection, disorder, natural disaster or other public emergency’. The term ‘other public emergency’ is undefined, leaving its scope open to judicial and scholarly interpretation. In Lesotho Human Rights Alert Group v Minister of Law and Constitutional Affairs (1997) LLR 235 (CA), the Court of Appeal held that an emergency must be of such a nature that it threatens the life of the nation and cannot be addressed through ordinary legal mechanisms. The current youth unemployment rate in Lesotho, reported at 39.1% according to the Bureau of Statistics Labour Force Survey (2024), has arguably reached such a scale impacting national stability, contributing to rising crime, and straining public services, that the Prime Minister’s characterisation of the crisis as a “public emergency” may be constitutionally justifiable.
Nonetheless, the declaration has ignited constitutional debates about executive overreach and the erosion of parliamentary oversight. In the absence of war or disaster, critics argue that economic hardship, however severe, should be addressed through legislative and policy channels, not emergency powers. Section 23(2) requires that a declaration of emergency be laid before Parliament within seven days, and it lapses after 14 days unless approved by a two-thirds majority. While this provides a safeguard, the practical reality is that Lesotho’s majoritarian parliamentary system may allow such declarations to go largely unchecked, particularly if framed as a politically urgent response to youth discontent.
Further, the declaration raises the issue of whether socio-economic rights are justiciable under Lesotho’s Constitution. Unlike the Constitution of South Africa, which explicitly entrenches socio-economic rights in ss 26–29, Lesotho’s Constitution contains limited provisions for socio-economic guarantees. However, the Principles of State Policy in Chapter III, though not justiciable, recognise the state’s obligation to secure education, employment, and social welfare. By declaring an emergency grounded in youth unemployment, the executive effectively elevates these non-binding principles into the realm of enforceable governance, albeit through exceptional means.
From a comparative perspective, this approach diverges from established constitutional democracies. In Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly 2016 (3) SA 580 (CC), the South African Constitutional Court emphasised the importance of accountability, transparency, and responsiveness as founding values of a constitutional democracy. By using emergency powers to address structural economic issues, there is a danger that the executive may bypass the ordinary checks and balances inherent in legislative and administrative processes.
Moreover, the long-term efficacy of emergency governance in addressing youth unemployment is doubtful. States of emergency are, by nature, temporary. They are not designed to remedy chronic structural issues like education-employment mismatches, informalisation of labour, and industrial policy failures. Without a robust legal framework to institutionalise youth development, through enforceable rights, targeted employment legislation, and vocational reforms, the declaration risks being a symbolic gesture rather than a substantive policy intervention.
Yet, it must also be acknowledged that the crisis facing young people in Lesotho is of constitutional significance. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981), ratified by Lesotho, recognises the right of every individual to work under equitable conditions (art 15) and obliges states to ensure the protection of youth against exploitation (art 17(3)). Lesotho’s obligations under international law, together with its commitments under the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and African Union frameworks, reinforce the notion that youth employment is not merely a policy issue but a human rights imperative.
The state of emergency, if used cautiously and lawfully, could create momentum for deeper reform. It may enable the fast-tracking of youth entrepreneurship legislation, social security reform, and amendments to the Labour Act to address informal and precarious employment. However, any such use of emergency powers must comply with constitutional limitations, respect the rule of law, and preserve the democratic process.
In conclusion, the declaration of a state of emergency in Lesotho based on youth unemployment is both constitutionally novel and politically charged. While arguably justifiable under s 23 in the face of a national crisis, its long-term legitimacy will depend on how the executive exercises the powers it grants. This development signals a potential shift in the interpretation of what constitutes a “public emergency” in constitutional law and underscores the urgent need to reframe youth unemployment as not only a developmental issue but a matter of fundamental rights and democratic stability.